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INTRODUCTION 
It is our contention that the essential difference which separates and 
. 
1- .. " divides human beings is still. and always will be. spiritual. in whatever 
material guise it is presented. and that. whether we recognize it or ignore 
it, all the more immediate, obvious differencel ultimately depend upon one: 
acceptance or rejection of belief in God in the full sense and meaning that 
this implies. It is our contention that the difference implied in men's dif-
ferent attitudes to God is fundamental; that men's attitudes on this ultimate, 
fundamental question determine the whole direction of living in all its 
aspects and in all relations, and that opposition in this one decisive matter 
implies secondary, but resultant opposition in outlook and value throughout 
nIl of life. 
As an illustration of this thesis we propose the case of the Magnanimous 
, ... 
Han, or, we should say, the Wagnanimous Men, for there are two of them. 
is the :Magnanimous Man of the Nicomachean Ethics, the product of Aristotle, 
and there is the magnanimous Uan of the Summa Theologicn, the product of st. 
Thomas AqUinas. The treasure of the former is in this world; the treasure of 
the latter is in the next. Vfuere their treasure is. there is their conflict. 
This ~nll become apparent as the character of each is investigated. 
In any consideration of this nature, it is impossible to be quite impar-
tial. If we have thought about the matter, we have inevitably come to same 
conclusions; we are bound to range ourselves on one side or the other; yet if 
1 
2 
our discussion is to serve any purpose we must endeavor to state the issues 
fairly. 
The Magnanimous Man is at once a philosophical and historical problem • 
. 
1- .,;, 
There is no doubt that the Aristotelian Magnanimous ~~ is the predecessor 
and type of his Thomistic counterpart. The relation is obvious and repeated-
ly acknowledged. The problem lies rather in bieaking away from the habit of 
looking on the Magnanimous Man of Aristotle simply as a predecessor. Unless 
we avoid~his error he will have no significance except in relation to the 
man he becomes in the Thomistic synthesis. His own personality will be lost, 
submerged in that of another. This thought is admirably expressed by Dr. 
Pegis in his masterful study, st. Thomas ~~ Greeks. 
To look on them (the Greeks) as the predecessors of Chris-
tian thought is, in part, to look on them out of focus. 
It is to look on them from a standpoint which is not their 
own. That is like saying that one must look at Greek 
philosophy with Christian eyes in order to understand what 
the Greeks were talking about.1 
st. Thomas Aquinas was a Christian philosopher. The Magnanimous Wan of 
the Summa Theo1ogica will be a Christian. Aristotle was a pagan philosopher. 
The Nagnanimous Man of the lTicomachean Ethics will be a pagan. This does not ; 
mean that the two will have no intercourse. It does mean that we must heed 
the warning of Etienne Gilson and not "baptize Aristotle in order to discuss 
philosophy with him."2 
After we have seen each Magnanimous Man in his own historical and phi1o-
1Anton C. Pegis. st. Thomas and the Greeks, Aquinas lectures, Marquette Uni-
versity Press, Milwaukee, 1939, 16-17. 
2Etienne Gilson. The Spirit of ~edieval Philosophy, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
New York, 1940, 8-;- -
sophical setting and interpreted his conduct and actions in this same light 
it ~~ll be an essential part of our study to note the differenoes between the 
two. 
; 
CHAPTER I 
THE MAGNANDlOUS MAN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE 
. 
1- .,;" The Magnanimous }tAIl, as his name implies, is concerned with great 
things. l In introducing him Aristotle tells us no more than this, preferring 
to present him in contrast with same of his fellows, that by looking at them 
and observing their actions we may see for ourselves and judge of him. 
First there is the temperate man. It takes no great discernment to dis-
tinguish him from the llagnanimous blan. He thinks himself worth little and 
rightly. He is not worth much. There is no greatness in his deeds nor in 
his deserts. He is not envious of the Magnanimous N~: envy, which is pain 
at the sight of good fortune, a man feels towards his equals.2 The temperate 
man acknowledges his inferiority. 
Not so the vain man. The Magnanimous Man has what he has not and he is 
envious. He thinks himself the equal of the }{l8.gnanimous }fAn. He yearns for 
reputation, honor, fame and fortune. He wants them for himself and thinks 
that he is entitled to them. Like the 1~gnanimous Man he seems to tend to 
great things, but in reality he is a man out of his depth. He does not know 
himself. In his attempt to equal the Magnanimous Man f s claim to great things 
and his possession of honor he flounders and blusters. He has such a-magni-
lAristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, In the Basic Works of Aristotle, Richard 
McKeon, ad., W. D. Ross, tr. NeWYork: Random House, 1941. IV, iii, 
1123 a 34. 2 . 
Rhet. II, x, 1387 b 23. 
4 
5 
fied opinion of his own excellence and ability that he oversteps it. The 
vain man dares not show himself for what he really is but affects an ostenta-
tious show; he needs must masquerade as magnanimous • 
. 
This is not the case with the pusil1anfm~us man. His little soul shriv-
els even more in the face of greatness. He under-estimates his own power and 
over-estimates the greatness of the work that Iaces him. That he differs 
from the Magnanimous Man is obvious. Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as 
littleness and greatness. Just as the magnanimous Man tends to great things 
out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things 
out of littleness of soul. The only justification that can be urged for him 
is ignorance of his own qualifications and fear of failure. He seems not to 
know himself "else he would have desired the things he was worthy of since 
these were good. u3 
Neither ignorance nor fear have any place in the life of the Magnanimous 
, .... 
NAn. He tends to the extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims. He 
has ability; he recognizes it. But he keeps the mean in respect of the 
rightness of them. He claims what is in accordance with his merits while the 
others go to excess or fall short.4 
We are left with the Magnanimous Man in possession of the great things 
he olaims and deserves. What, then, are these things? Above all thiags else 
the N~gnanimous Man claims honor. 
Desert is relative to external goods; and the greatest of 
these, we should say, is that which we render to the gods, 
3E, .. r IV ... . l.. , ~~J., 
4E. N. IV, iii, 
1125 a 22, 23. 
1123 b 13, 14. 
I 
and which people of position most aim at, and which is the 
prize appointed for the noblest deeds. S 
6 
It is not his claint to honor that distinguishes the Magnanimous Man from 
the Vain :Man and the Pusillanimous N..a.n. ThEt,Y'..;}fere concerned with honor, too; 
it is the rightness of his claims that sets him apart. Surely, his claim is 
just. Honor is the token of a man's being notable for doing good and mag-
nanimity is the virtue that disposes a man to to good on a grand scale. 6 
If we consider him point by point we will see the utter ab-
surdity of a YAgnanimous Man who is not good.1 
If the Magnanimous YAn deserves the greatest honors he must be good in 
the highest degree. The more praiseworthy things are, the nobler and, there-
fore, the better they are. So it is with things that earn greater honors 
than others; honor is, as it were, a measure of value. The Magnanimous Man 
must be good, then, and greatness in every virtue must oharacterize him. 
The first point that illustrates the goodness of the 1~gnanimous Man is 
his courage. "It would be unbecoming for the Magnaninlous NAn to fly from 
danger, swinging his arms by his sides. 1t8 And, again, 
He does not run into dangers, nor is he fond of danger, be-
oause he honors few things; but he will face great dangers, 
and when he is in danger he is unsparing of his life, know-
ing that there are oonditions on which life is not worth 
having. 9 
We can judge better of the Magnanimous Man's courage if we investigat~ Aris-
SE. N. IV, iii, 1123 b 16-20. 
6Rhet7 I, v, 1361 a 21; I, ix, 1366 b 16. 
'lE.'"N. IV, iii, 1123 b 33. We shall substitute 'Magnanimous' for 'Proud' 
Which W. D. Ross uses but which he acknowledges (p. 99ln) "has not the ety-
mological associations of 'megalopsyohia.,1t 
8E• N. IV, 111, 1123 b 32. 
9"E:" N:" IV, ii i, 1124 b 6-8. 
7 
totle's requirements, for ordinary courage will not suffice for a man pledged 
to great things. Being magnanimous he must perform the greatest acts of 
courage. 
1- .,;, 
Disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, are all evils, but 
the courageous man is not ooncerned with all of them. To fear some things 
is right and noble; it would be base not to fetr them. Poverty and disease 
he ought not to fear, nor, in general, the evils that do not flow from vice 
and which are outside a man's control. But not even the man that is fearless 
of these is brave. With what sort of terrible things, then, is the brave man 
concerned? Surely, with the greatest. Now death is the most terrible of 
evils because it is the end. But the brave man would not seem to be con-
cerned even with death in all circumstances, but only in the noblest. Such a 
death would be met in face of the greatest and noblest danger. Those who 
thus lay down their lives are honored in the city-states. Properly speaking, 
, .... 
then, he alone can be called truly courageous who is fearless in the face of 
a noble death and all emergencies that involve death.10 
This is the condition on which the Magnanimous Man "considers life not 
worth having" but it does not give us a complete picture of the courage of 
the llagnanimous Man. Of course he would not shrink from laying down his life; 
but opportunities of this kind are not daily occurrences and courage is woven 
into the very texture of his lire. The Magnanimous Man "will not run from 
danger swinging his arms" because fear does not enter into his make-up. A 
man is afraid when he is at the mercy of another; not so the Magnanimous NAn. 
10E• N. III, vi, 1115 a 11-32. 
8 
Bein~ superior to others, of whom would he be afraid? What could any man do 
to him that would cause him. to fear? A man who has done wrong is afraid; he 
lives in fear of retaliation.ll But the Magnanimous Man would never wrong 
. 
1- .,;, 
anyone. That would be disgraceful, and why should a man to whom nothing is 
great do disgraceful acts? Shame would keep him from wronging another and 
so bringing discredit upon himself; what could.ever accrue to him from such a 
deed that would recompense hinl for such an evil? Again, our rivals for a 
thing cause us to fear. But only ambitious men have rivals, men who are 
striving for something that exceeds their merits but not their desires. These 
are SODe of the reasons why ordinary men are fearful. They have no point of 
application in the case of the Magnanimous Man. In the face of these con-
tingenoies he remains calm. ffuen a man is calm and fearless in all oiroum-
stanoes it can be traced to two reasons: first, he may have no experienoe of 
the thing at hand. This really is a fact in the case of the N;agnanimous Man. 
, .... 
The fears that trouble others and cause them to flee are outside his experi-
ence. In the seoond place a man is unafraid if he has the means to deal with 
the ciroumstanoes at hand. The Na.gnanimous NAIl feels that he is superior to 
others in the number and inlportance of the advantages that make men formi-
dable.12 
What is true of courage is true of all the virtues, for Magnaninl1ty, be-
ing a sort of crown of all the virtues, makes them greater and is not found 
IlRhet. II, v. 1382 b 1; E. N. IV, iii, 1123 b 33, 34. "(It would be unbe-
'C'Oming for a 1l:agnanimous-rrru;y to "'Tong another; for to what end should he 
do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is great." 
12Rhet. II, v. 1313 a 27 sq. 
9 
.' 
without them. 13 Beoause it implies the praotioe of the greatest aots of all 
the virtues, magnanimity is diffioult, in fact it is impossible, without 
nobility and goodness of character.14 When a man performs the greatest acts 
. 
1- .. ., 
of justioe, courage, temperanoe, magnifioenoe, liberality, gentleness, pru-
dence and wisdom and performs them not only because they are worthy of praise, 
but for their own sake, whioh nobility require;, he has merited his olaim to 
honor. 
We might ask what nobility signifies that makes it a requisite quality 
for the man who would practioe the greatest aots of all the virtues. Nobili-
ty of oharacter impels a man to perform great acts of virtue simply for the 
reward of honor, rather than money or any material benefit. It prompts him 
to perform aots that are desirable for some one else's sake without thinking 
of his own interests. All actions done for the sake of others and all suc-
cesses whioh benefit others are noble since these, less than other aotions, 
.... 
are done for one's self. In fine, nobility impels a man to do the opposite 
of those things whioh would make him say, do, or intend anything of which he 
would be ashamed. 
Without nobility and goodness of oharaoter a man who is directly con-
eerned with honor is in danger of beooming a slave of honor. Not so the Mag-
nanimous Man. Men who are the slaves of honor seek it for its own sa~e; he 
is not conoerned with honor in that he seeks it as an end. The Magnanimous 
~~ seeks only to be worthy of honor. 
l3E. N. IV, iii, 1124 a 1, 2. 
14--~~ IV, iii, 1124 a 3,4. 
; 
r 
At honors that are great and conferred by good men he will 
be moderately pleased, thinking that he is cOming by his 
own or even less than his arm; for there can be no honor 
that is worthy of perfect virtue, yet he will at any rate 
accept it since they have nothing greater to bestow on him.15 
. 
.. .. , 
10 
It is costly to labor for such a reward, but the Magnanimous Man will never 
become the slave of honor simply because he is above honor. Honor and a good 
reputation are among the most precious thingsihat life can offer him; they 
are the only things that men can offer. They are an inadequate reward it is 
true; but the Magnanimous Man is not thinking in terms of reward. He is 
moderately pleased when he is honored by those whom he considers good judges. 
His neighbors are better judges than people at a distance; his associates 
and fellow-oountr~~en better than strangers; his oontemporaries better than 
posterity; good men are best of all. It is signifioant that the ~~gnanimous 
Man is most pleased with recognition from the prudent man,lS realizing that 
honor oonferred by a man of such discernment is a true testament of worthi-
... 
ness. The man of practical wisdom, and good men generally, are not likely to 
be deoeived about true virtue nor are they apt to be lavish in their praise. 
~ith honor from such as these the Magnanimous 1~ is moderately pleased. He 
is only moderately pleased beoause his attention is oentered on great acts of 
virtue and not on honor. Then, too, the honor of men, even of the prudent 
man, is not an adequate reward of perfeot virtue. And if man has nothing 
greater to offer, who has? Resignation is not conducive to exuberance. 
But honor from casual people and on trifling grounds he 
will utterly despise, sinoe it is not this that he deserves, 
15E• N. IV, iii, 1124 a 5-9. 
16lr-!!.!!. I, iv, 1095 b 27. 
; 
11 
and dishonor too, since in his case it cannot be just.17 
The Magnanimous Man could not but despise honor and credit bestowed on 
him by those who are inferior to him. Virtue demands it. Honor is a measure 
. 
of value. 
.. .. ., 
Only the good man, the man practiced in virtue, is capable of a 
just evaluation. Casual people value honor for its own sake and insult the 
Magnanimous Man by inferring that their stand~ds are his. He does not con-
sider honor "as if it were a very great thing. fllB After all, what are the 
honors that men can offer? Sacrifices, commemorations in verse or prose, 
privileges, grants of land, front seats at civic celebrations, state burial, 
statues.19 'Vhat are these things that the ~~gnanimou8 1Uul should desire thena 
Vlliat proportion is there betvreen these things and perfect virtue? The man 
who values honor for its own sake is pleased with recognition fram casual 
people because it makes him see himself in the charaoter of a fine fellow. 
The Magnanimous Man, knowing his worthiness and the justice of his claims is 
..... 
above such conduct. Such motives as these are unworthy of the Magnanimous 
Man. 
Power and wealth ~re desirable for the sake of honor (at 
least those who have them wish to get honor by means of 
them); and for him to v/ham even honor is a little thing 
the others must be so too. Hence Magnanimous Men are 
thought to be disdainful. 20 
The Magnanimous Man is bound to be misunderstood by his inferiord. Such 
is orten the case with men of virtue. "110 man is a prophet in his own coun-
17E• N. IV, iii, 1124 a 11-13. 
l~NIV iii, 1124 a 16. .l!J. • , 
19R'het:" 
2015 r IV, iii, 1724 a 17-19. . ~. 
--
I 
12 
try" and a man of such perfect virtue as the l,:agnanimous Man is looked on 
askance by those not so familiar with virtue and to whom it is a well-merited 
rebuke. They resent the fact that he is powerful, and completely misinter-
. 
1- .. ., 
pret the great deeds that his power permits him to do. Power is a dangerous 
weapon, in the hands of a man without virtue. The Magnanimous Man realizes 
that power is a trust. The sense of responsibility makes him serious. He 
must pay attention to the duties of his position. The respeot in whioh he is 
held inspires him with dignity; but this dignity is mistaken for disdain and 
arroganoe by his inferiors who do not realize that dignity is a mild and be-
ooming form of arrogance.2l 
Wealth could not be in better hands than those of the 1:agnanimous Man, 
but as with power, so with wealth. It is misunderstood by many. The 1~g;-
nanimous Man is not judged by them by his own standards but by those of the 
ordinary type of character produoed by wealth. People see that wealthy men 
... 
are insolent, that their possession of wealth goes to their heads. Such men 
feel that in possessing wealth they have every good thing that exists. They 
make it a standard of value by which they judge everything else and they 
think that there is nothing that wealth oannot buy. Suoh men are luxurious 
and ostentatious: luxurious beoause of the way they live and the prosperity 
they display; ostentatious and vulgar beoause their minds are regularIy 00-
cupied with the object of their love and admiration and also because they 
think that other peoplets ideas of happiness are the same as their own. It 
is quite natural that they should think this way, for if a man has money 
21Rhet • II, xvii, 1391 a 29. 
; 
13 
there are always plenty of people who will come begging from him. In short, 
the ordinary type of character produced by wealth is that of the prosperous 
fool. 22 
1- .• ., 
Casual people, observing these characteristics of wealthy men do not 
realize that it is wealth vdthout virtue that produces such characters. 
Wealth places a man in a position of superiori~ and everything that is supe-
rior is held in honor. However, those who have wealth without virtue are 
neither justified in their claim to honor nor are they magnanimous, for Mag-
nanimity implies perfect virtue. 
For without virtue it is not easy to bear gracefully the 
goods of fortune; and, being unable to bear them, and 
thinking themselves superior to others, they despise 
others, and themselves do what they please. They imitate 
the Magnanimous Man without being like him. 23 
With wealth the Magnanimous Man can act expeditiously. Virtue needs ex-
ternal good for it is impossible, or not easy, to do great deeds without the 
proper equipment. It takes money to produce great works. Friends, riches 
and power, while not essential to the Magnanimous Man, are instruments of 
which he makes good use. With them he can effect must that without them he 
would be powerless to bring about. He despises them in as muoh as he does 
not think them so great as to do anything unbecoming for their sake. On the 
other hand he prizes them in so far as they are useful for the accomp~ishment 
of virtuous deeds. If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither 
very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. 
22Rhet • II xv, 1390 b 31 sq. ~ , ~~ IV, iii, 1124 a 30; 1124 b 2. 
; 
14 
The Magnanimous Man despises the "prosperous fool" for his vulgarity. 
He himself is educated in riches. He "bears graoefully the good of fortune." 
It would be unthinkable that the Magnanimous Man would use his wealth in 
1- .,;" 
vulgar ostentation. It is true that he "possesses beautiful and profitless 
things rather than profitable and useful ones,,;24 these are more fitting 
than others for a gentleman. 25 Those things aie particularly good which are 
a man's very own, which no one else possesses. There is no distinction in 
having the things which everyone has. Practioal things may be had by one's 
equals and even by one's inferiors. Their possession is an admission of de-
pendence,--not "proper to a oharacter that suffices to itself. ff26 Further-
more, the possession of beautiful and profitless things is not vulgar osten-
tation. Like great deeds, beautiful things are rare. 
The Magnanimous Man uses his wealth virtuously. Wealth used virtuously 
is employed in providing and preserving good things; magnanimity disposes a 
... 
man to do good to others on a grand scale. 
He is the sort of man to confer benefits; but is ashamed of 
receiving them; for the one is the mark of a superior and 
the other of an inferior.27 
The NAgnanimous Man is quiok to see the needs of others and to supply them 
their wants. It is a mark of a virtuous man to provide for others. Besides, 
to confer a benefit implies both possession and superiority. A man cannot 
give what he does not possess; he who can supply what is lacking to others is 
24E. N. IV, iii, 1125 a 12, 13. 
2SPillet7 I, ix, 1367 a 27. 
26E. N. IV, iii, 1125 a 13. 
27!!. N. IV, iii, 1124 b 9, 10. 
15 
.' 
their superior. The Magnanimous Man is ashamed of receiving benefits because 
it is a mark of inferiority, an acknowledgment of need. For the most part he 
is safeguarded against such a humiliation because what need could a Magnani-
. 
1- .,;" 
mous Man possibly have, and, granting that he did stand in need of something, 
who would there be who could fulfill it? 
However, should it happen that he were fo~estalled in beneficence by 
another, the N~gnanimous NAn is quick to recover his position of superiority. 
He is apt to confer greater benefits in return; for thus the 
original benefactor beside~8being paid a debt will be the 
gainer by the transaction. 
Generosity is one of the virtues in which the Magnanimous Man excels. 
In the event that another had benefited him it would be niggardly and unbe-
coming a man of his position if he were careful to return the benefit in kind 
and exactly. In that case the act would be a mere return and not a kindness. 
Rather, it would be more fitting that he outdo his benefactor for this would 
not only be in accordance with generosity, but more especially it would be 
more in keeping with his position. 
Some hold it against liAgnanimous Men that 
They seem to remember any service they have done, but not 
those they have received (for he who received a service is 
inferior to him who has done it, but the Magnanimous Man 
wishes to be superior), and to hear of the former with 
pleasure and the latter with displeasure. 29 
This charge is true but needs some explanation. He remembers the services he 
bas rendered because he delights in fulfilling the needs of others. Such op-
28 E. N. IV, iii, 1124 b 11-13. 
29E• N. IV, iii, 1124 b 13-15. 
; 
16 
.' 
portunities give him real joy. They are so many occasions of exercising vir-
tue and of living up to his position. One remembers events that are joyous 
and gratifying. The Magnanimous Man is not the only one 'Who remembers these 
1- .. " 
services. The reoipients are like.vise mindful of the favors done them, of 
the need that was supplied. Men have a way of remembering those 'Who have al-
leviated their sufferings or in any way helped ... them. The Nl8.gnanimous Man is 
not mindful of the servioes that he has reoeived, for these services did not 
fulfill any real need, much less any desire. He aooepted them, it is true; 
it would have been unbecoming to refuse others these little opportunities of 
gratification; but once the debt is repaid in abundance, why should he be 
mindful of it? 
It is a mark of the Magnanimous Man ••• to be dignified 
toward people who enjoy high position and good fortune, 
but unassuming towards those of the middle class; for it is 
a diffioult and lofty thing to be superior to the former, 
but easy to be so to the latter, and a lofty bearing over 
the former is no mark of ill-breeding, but among humble 
people it is as vulgar as a display of strength against the 
weak. 30 
This attitude is especially charaoteristio of the Magnanimous Man. He 
is guided by good taste, a sense of what should be done, of 'What is fitting. 
To adopt a deferential attitude toward people in high positions would be as 
great a breach of etiquette, as great a mark of ill-breeding, as to adopt a 
lofty attitude toward the lowly. He demands and must demand deference as his 
. 
due; he does not assert himself; is not aggressive; he is simply oonsoious of 
his own worth and of his duty to himself and his position. 
30E• !:. IV, iii, 1124 b 17-23. 
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Again, it is characteristic of the Magnanimous Man not to 
aim at things commonly held in honor, or the things in 
which others excel; to be sluggish and to hold back ex-
cept where great honor or a great work is at stake, and 
to be a man of few deeds but of great and notable ones.31 
. 
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These characteristics should not cause surprise. No one hires an ar-my 
of men to do a piece of work that could be done by one man. To what purpose 
would the Magnanimous Man waste his time over lorks in which most others 
could succeed? He is not concerned with many works but with great works. 
Let others do the works that are proportioned to their talents and abilities. 
When the work is one that is equal to his merits and in conformity with his 
position the .Magnanimous Man will readily undertake it. Obviously, such 
tasks are not numerous. 
The next point in the character of the Magnanimous !-Ian which Aristotle 
presents has to do with his intercourse with others. 
He must also be open in his hate and in his love (for to 
conceal one's feelings, i.e.,to care less for truth than 
for what people will think, is a coward's part), and must 
speak and act openly; for he is free of speech because he 
is contemptuous, and is given to telling the truth, ex-
cept v.rhen in irony he speaks to the vulgar.32 
The reason which Aristotle gives "because he is contemptuous" could not be 
more indicative. A man feels contempt for vmat he considers unimportant. 33 
What other people think just does not matter to the Magnanimous 11an. Human 
respect is paralysing. Why should the Magnanimous Man conceal his hates or 
loves? What difference does it make to him whether others agree with him or 
31E• N. IV, iii, 1124 b 23-27. 
32v--E. N. IV, iii, 1124 b 27-30. 
33Rhet7 II, ii, 1387 b 15. 
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not? He is a man of decided opinions. He hates what is vulgar, what is bad 
forn, and he doesn't care who knows it, least of all those who offend in 
these respects. 
1- .. ., 
l~or is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not the part of a Ma.n-
nanimous Man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, 
but to overlook them. 34 
The same moti va is at work here. The 11a~imous Man is not mindful of 
wrongs because he considers them unimportant. Why should he stop over them? 
One only remembers the things that one considers important. It would be un-
seamly for a man to wham the greatest honor and even dishonor is as nothing, 
to fret over trifles; for a man of few and notable deeds to ooncentrate on 
something so insignifioant. To do so would be to invest them with an im-
portance that they oould never merit. 
Nor is he a gossip; for he will neither speak about himself 
nor about another, since he cares not to be praised nor for 
others to be blamed.35 
That the Magnanimous :Man would not talk about himself goes without say-
ing. In the first plaoe it would be bad form, unworthy a man of his position 
Seoondly, and more obviously, the A1agnanimous Man doesn't have to talk about 
himself. His notable deeds, his goodness and nobility of character, his per-
feet virtue, speak for him. What is more, he would be drawing attention to 
the inferiority of others, which would be unkind. Those who talk about them-
selves have no other means of drawing attention to themselves. They must be 
their own press agents. 
34E• N. IV, iii, 1125 a 3, 5. 
3SE:" N • IV, iii, 1125 a 5-7. 
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Nor is the Magnanimous Van a gossip. The small talk and choice bits of 
the gossip mongers are utterly beneath him. Gossip and much talking about 
others often results in others being blamed. Even though others do not equal 
him in virtue the :Magnanimous Man wants thei to have their due. Those who 
try to get others blamed are trying to thwart them because they conside~ them 
rivals. The Magnanimous Man has no rivals. T~ese others cannot do him any 
good nor can they do him any harrrl. ~~y should he talk about them at all? 
)1.hy should he do or say anything that might cause shame or annoyance to 
others? Just because he is superior to others he need not rob them of the 
little honor or reputation due them. The Magnanimous !t:an expects to be re-
spected by his inferiors in birth, capacity and goodness. He looks for re-
spect from those whom he is treating well, not from those whom he has fright-
aned into an attitude of respect. 
He nrust be unable to make his life revolve around another, 
unless he be a friend; for this is slavish, and for this 
reason all flatterers are servile and people lacking in 
self respect are flatterers. 3G 
Casual people are fond of flatterers; the Magnanimous Wan, loving truth, 
hates flattery. He looks with pity on those who stoop so low and vdth equal 
pity on those who solace their wounded pride and shattered ambitions on the 
smooth phrases of flatterers. Friends are different. The Magnanimous Man is 
devoted to his friends. They think good the same things that he values. 
They are good tempered and not too ready to show him his mistakes. They 
praise his good qualities; they believe in his goodness and virtue. Their 
3GE • .!!. 1124 b 30; 1125 a 2. 
; 
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deferenoe is respectful not servile. They do not try to thwart the Jr;agnani-
mous N~ in his aspirations nor to get in his v~y. 
A slow step is thought proper to the Magnanimous Man, a 
deep voice and a level utteranoe; JQj; the man who .takes 
few things seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor 
the man who thinks nothing great to be excit~d, while a 
shrill voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry 
and exoitement.37 
Calmness 1s one of the outstanding oharaoteristios of the NAgnanimous NAn. 
Hurry and excitement are typioa1 of man who are busy about many things, or 
who have undertaken either more or greater things than they oan aocomplish. 
The Magnanimous AAn considers well an action before he undertakes it. He 
must make sure that it is worthy of his efforts (such things are not so nu-
merous as to make him a busy man) and that it is proportioned to his ability. 
Onoe these oonditions have been assured he prooeeds with the qUiet dignity 
becoming him to accomplish the work at hand. His is the easy consoiousness 
of effortless superiority. , .... 
The vAgnanimous Uan whom we have been considering is one of the outstand-
ing characters which Aristotle presents in the course of the Nicomachean 
Ethios. He is cultured, reasonable, self-controlled. He is consoious of 
himself as representative of an elite. He is a superior being. The essenoe 
of his superiority is moderation and wisdom, kindness and good sense, the 
" 
'nothing too much' as a oounse1 of perfection. With it goes the sense of ob-
ligation, of duty towards himself, his neighbor, the oommunity, of leading 
the "good life" as an end in itself; almost one might say, for the sake of 
37E. ~ IV, iii. 11Z5 a 13-16. 
I 
21 
self-respeot. The "good life" he sees as moderate, harmonious, balanced. 
With this moderate ideal there goes a reasoned pride, not exaggerated pride, 
that is bad form; it is "not done" by the NJ8.gnanimous Nl8ll • 
• til' He has achieved and he knows it, why pretend? He is a superior being 
as compared with others and he knows it. He surpasses them in exactly those 
qualities which he values; in control and modeiation and self-respeot. He 
knows what is due to himself and what is due to others and will, in so far as 
he lives up to his principles, take care to apportion their relative claims 
justly, but he will not be unfair to himself, or forego his rights, why should 
he? Undue humility is as dist~steful to him as exaggerated pride. 
His relations are all "relation-to-man" values; he is at his best in 
purely human relations so long as we do not endeavor to force him beyond the 
bounds that limit him, or to speak to him in a language he does not know. If 
we do that, we are stopped short, for he cannot function outside of his own 
medium; he oannot breathe another atmosphere; but here, on his own grounds, 
he is supreme. 
I 
CHAPTER II 
THE MAGNANIMOUS MAN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 
. 
. .. ; 
In the Aristotelian moral oode where what is morally good is essentially 
that which merits praise and honor, there was no doubt as to the virtue of a 
man who was concerned with honor "on the grand,.sca1e" and who was "good in 
the highest degree." The Magnanimous Man of st. Thomas is not going to have 
other concerns. st. Thomas is going to present us with just such a man but 
he is going to make an important distinction. The Magnanimous Man of the 
Summa Theo1ogica is ever mindful of what the Magnanimous Man of the Nicama-
chean h~hics did not know, that in the order of good the initiative is always 
with God. Everything comes from God, even the Magnanimous Man's co-operation. 
He is intent upon great deeds, deeds worthy of the highest honors, but he 
knows that it is only with God and through Him that he will achieve. 
The knowledge of this fundamental fact affects his attitude towards 
honor. Since magnanimity, from its very name implies a striving for great 
things, the NJ8.gnanimous Man of st. Thomas is going to be ooncerned ohief1y 
with honor. Of the external goods that lay open to man's choice, he recog-
nizes riches, honor and power as having the greatest appeal. Of these honor 
is the greatest since it approaches closest to virtue and witnesses to" a man's 
virtue and because it is given to God and to the best and because men set 
lSum. Theol. II-II, Q. 129 J a.l, c. ftMagnanimitas ex suo nomine importat 
quamdam erlensionem animi ad magna. ft _, 
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aside everything in order to win honor and to avoid shame they are ready to 
sacrifice all else.2 
But it is not just with ordinary honors that the Magnanimous Man is con-
cerned; it is with the greatest honors. That ts What makes it a difficult 
virtue to practice. For the desirability of honor presents a serious threat 
to reason's command. So many snares lurk in th: shadow of honor's attractive-
ness that a virtue regulative of honor is necessary. From the point of view 
of reason, it is difficult for a man to ascertain just how far he may go in 
his pursuit of honor. Likewise he gets little help from the matter of this 
virtue, for honor has a way of battering down the restraining check of 
reason.3 
Honor is not the reward of virtue in the sense that the Magnanimous Man 
seeks it as his reward. The real reward of virtue is happiness which is the 
end of virtue. Honor is the reward of virtue only in as far as others are 
concerned, for men have nothing greater than honor to offer him. Yet this 
does not make honor an adequate reward. 
Honor non est sufficiens virtutis praemium; sed nihil potest 
esse in humanis rebus et corporalibus majus honore, inquantum 
soilicet ipsae corporales res sunt signa demonstrativa ex-
ce11entis virtutis.4 
In this very insufficiency of honor as a reward of virtue there lies 
". 
2Sum. Theol. II-II, Q. 129, a.l, c. ftRes autem quae in usum hominis veniunt 
sunt res exteriores; inter quas simpliciter maximum est honor, tum quia pro-
pinquissimum est virtuti, utpote testifactio quaedam existens de virtute ali-
cujus, ut supra habitum est tum etiam quia homines propter honorem conse-
quendum, ut et vituperium vitandum, alia omnia postponunt. fI 
3Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 129, a.2, c. 
4Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 131, a.l, ad 2. 
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danger. The man who traffics in honor treads on dangerous ground. That st. 
Thomas realized that man needs a virtue governing his expectations of this 
witness of virtue from men is evident fram the three ways which he enumerates 
in which the desire of honor may be inordinate. In the first place, a man 
may desire more than his share of honor. If the Magnanimous Man were to fail 
on this point he would by that very fact forfe\t his claim to virtue, for 
there can be no virtue if the rule of reason is violated. Because he is 
striving for the greatest honors, it does not follow that there is no limit 
to the honor which he may claim. When we consider the absolute quantity of 
the honor toward which the U.agnanimous Man tends, we must qualify it as ex-
treme and the limit; but if the same honors are studied in the light of other 
Circumstances, the rule of reason is seen to be safeguarded. The Magnanimous 
llan must seek the greatest honors for it is with such honors that Magnanimity 
is concerned, but he must seek them reasonably, that is where and when he 
ought.5 
It is the moderation which reason injects into honor which establishes 
lJagnanimity as a virtuous habit. The 1'1.agnanimous Man tends to great acts but I 
in moderation. The moderation is not measured by the greatness of the aots 
because the IvJagnanimous ],!all aims at the greatest acts possible. Moderation 
is achieved by.the Magnanimous Man in two ways: in his choice of the great 
and in his proportion to the great. With regard to his choice of the great, 
he seeks that which is simply or absolutely great; he does not seek honor as 
an end in itself; it is not the objeot of his will for he reckons it trivial 
5 Sum. Theol. I-II, Q. 64, a.l, ad 2. 
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since it is an empty and passing good. It is for this reason that he does 
not care so much to be honored as to be worthy of honor, since honor is the 
witness to virtue. In the seoond place reason demands that the great deeds 
..... 
to which he tends be in proportion to his competency and his merits. 
NJ8.gnanimitas mediocriter tendit in magna. Sed haec medio-
critas non attenditur mediocritas in duobus: scilicet in 
eleotione magni et in proportione su~ ad magnum. In el-
eotione magni dioo: quia tendit in i~ quod est magnum 
simplioiter quod est soilicet actus virtus perfectus; non 
autem tendit principaliter in id quod est magnum secundum 
quid, sicut sunt exteriora bona, inter quae praecipus 
magnum honor. Non enim magnanimus honor em quaerit tam-
quam finem voluntatis suae, quia hoc nimis sibi parvum 
reputat, cum sit vanum et transitorium bonum, sed fieri 
honore dignum secundum quod est testimonium virtutis. 6 
It is an excellent thing to aim high and to desire and value one's own honor, 
which, after virtue, is most worthy of our efforts; but it is an excellent 
thing only if a man proportions his desires and his efforts to his merits and 
his capacity. His limit must be the highest honor that reason tells him that 
he is worthy of. 7 
In the second plaoe, he may desire honor for himself without referring it 
to God. Lastly, there is the danger that his desire for honor may lead him 
to rest in the honor itself, ~thout using it to the profit of others.8 
611 Sent. Dist. 42, Q. 2, a.4, c. 
'Ill Sent. Dist. 42, Q.2, a.4, c. "Inania gloria non tendit in id quod est 
magnum simpliciter, et quod magnanimitas per se quaerit, sed in magnum ex-
terius, ut in laudem, vel honorem, vel aliquid hujusmodi; superbia vero ten-
dit in magnum simpliciter, sed non secundum proportionem suam; ••• " 
8Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 131, a.l, c. "Tripliciter autem appetitum contingit 
esse inordinatum: uno modo per hoc quod aliquis appetit testimonium de ex-
cellentia quam non habet, quod est appetere honorem supra suam proportionem; 
alio modo per hoc quod honor em sibi cupit, non referendo in Deum; tertio per 
hoc quod appetitus ejus in ipso honore quiescit, non refer ens honor em ad 
utilitatem aliorum." 
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st. Thomas does not point out the dangers without offering any remedy to 
offset them. He advances a two-fold solution to these difficulties. The 
Magnanimous Man must remember that he has not from himself that in which he 
excels. 
... , 
It is, as it were, something divine in him, and so honor, though, 
it is given to him, is due really to God. He may not stop over the honors 
that are accorded him; he may not rest in them • ..., With the ~a.me movement with 
whioh he reoeives the honor he must pass it on to God to wham it is due. 
The seoond point whioh st. Thomas bids the Magnanimous Man remember lest 
he be misled by honor is that the exoellence which he has and whioh he pos-
sesses due to God's bounty, is a trust, given him not for himself, but that 
he may use it to the profit of others. He must answer for the honor entrust-
ed to him. This implies on the one hand that there has been a trust made 
over to him, and on the other hand that there is a higher authority from whom 
it has been received and to whom the aocount is due. 
Viewed thus, honor loses much of the danger with whioh it is charged. 
Yet the danger is not entirely removed. st. Thomas would have the Magnani-
mous Man penetrated with the thought that, "It is God who v(orketh in you, 
both to will and to accamplish • .,9 Magnanimity regards pursuit, the pursuit 
of honors. The UAgnanimous 1:an must strive to do what is worthy of honor, 
yet not so as to think much of the honor acoorded by men. st. Thomas ~eemed 
to think that the safety of the NAgnanimOUS Man lay in his being hUlllble. 
There is no other way of accounting for the importanoe which st. Thomas gives 
to hUlllility in conneotion with magnanimity. 
9phil • 2: 13. 
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In explaining the har.mony between these two virtues which are apparently 
so contrary, St. Thomas' treatment recalls the "fortiter et suaviter" of 
Scripture. It is not to be honored by men that 'the 1~~animous Man strives 
for great things. ~ 047 It is true that he looks upon great honors as his due and 
as something that he deserves. Men should honor him. They can never suf-
fioiently honor goodness which deserves to be hinored by God and which is his 
thanks to the goodness of God.10 
He is not puffed up by great honors beoause he does not deem them above 
him; rather he despises them. And so he is not cast down or discouraged by 
dishonor. He despises that, too, because he sees clearly that he does not 
deserve it. 
Magnanimity concentrating on great works, moderates the expectations of 
honor. If his expectations are too great, a man will begin in despair to be 
satisfied with petty things. On the other hand, they must not be too small, 
... 
for then he will refUse to undertake great things. It is magnanimity that 
makes the adjustment. The great things for whioh the YAgnanimous Man is 
striving are difficult and at once attract and repel. They attract because 
of their goodness and repel because they are difficult to attain. With re-
spect to their attractiveness, hope surges up to urge him on. N~gnanimity 
approaches closer to hope than can be said of any other virtue. This is be-
cause it is the direction of the appetite to a good that is difficult to ob-
tain and therefore it turns on hope and its oPPosite. ll At the same time 
lOSum. Theol. II-II, Q. 129, a.2, ad 3. 
1111 Sent. Dist. XXVI, Q. 2, a.2, ad 4. 
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despair looms up to hold him back. Hope and despair are motions, surgings of 
the sensitive appetite: the one pursuing a good that in spite of its diffi-
culties is judged possible; the other fleeing from good because its very dif-
;.p 047 
ficulty makes· it appear impossible of attainment. In this situation a man 
has need of a holy boldness: a two-fold virtue with respect to the difficult 
good: one to tamper and restrain his mind lest~it tend to great things im-
moderately, and the other to strengthen his mind against despair and urge him 
on to the pursuit of great things according to reason. The one virtue is 
humility, the other magnanimity. St. Thomas considers them as a two-fold 
virtue, the one the obvert of the other. 
Et ideo circa appetitum boni ardui neoessaria est duplex 
virtus. Una quidem quae tamperet et refrenet animwm, ne 
immoderate tendat in excelso; et hoc pertinet ad virtutem 
humilitatis. Alia vero quae firmet animwm contra despera-
tionem magnorum secundum rectam; et haec est magnanimitas.12 
At first sight the two virtues seam to imply a contradiction. Humility 
implies praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. lS Magnanimity aims 
at great deeds worthy of honor. How are we to reconcile these two virtues, 
the one of which aims at great things while the other shuns them? St. Thomas 
does it by showing that humility and magnanimity, though they differ as to 
their formal object, have the same material objeot. Humility restrains a man 
from aiming at great things against right reason: magnanimity urges him on 
to great things in acoord with right reason. Magnanimity is, then, not op-
posed to humility tor they concur in this, that each is according to right 
l2Sum. Theol. II-II, Q. 161, a.l, o. 
13Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 161, a.l, ad 2. 
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reason.14 
However, although they agree as to the matter, they differ as to the 
mode. The humble man subjects and abases h~self fram the consideration of 
his own fragility, while the llagnanimous Man aims at great things from the 
consideration of God's help and His gifts. lS 
Gilson aptly remarks of magnanimity: • 
It is a tight rope that this virtue walks, for to believe 
ourselves able to reach what is above our heads is pre-
sumption; to believe ourselves worthy of an honor not in 
line with our true merit is ~bition; to like honors won 
on false titles or as seen by mants fallible mind, or for 
any other end than God's honor orman's good, is vain and 
empty glory.16 
In virtue of his being humble, the Magnanimous Man recognizes his true 
position with respect to his Creator and his fellow creatures and he is dis-
posed to shape his oonduct acoordingly. Humility is the true expression in 
thought and conduot of what a man really is. Hence it is based on truth. wit 
is not false self-depreciation. l7 It is possible for him to have the full 
perfection of the virtue and yet be perfeotly aware of his endowments. Hu-
mility is not merely thinking little of one's self. It is rather not think-
l4Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 161, a.l, ad 3. "Humi11tas reprimit appetitum ne 
tendat in magna praetor rationem reot~; magnanimitas aut em animum ad magna. 
impellit secundum rationem rectam. Unde patet quod magnanimitas non op-
ponitur humilitati; sed oonveniunt in hoo quod utraque est seoundum ratio-
nem reotam." 
15111 Sent. Dist. XXXIII, Q. 2, a.l, ad 3. "Humilitas autem habet idem pro 
materia quod magnanimitas, quamvis sub dlversis rationibus; quia humilitas 
rationem parvi ex oonsideratione propriae fragilitatis, sed magnanimitas 
rationem ma~ni ex oonsideratione divinii auxilii, vel divini doni, vel gra-
o " tuiti, vel naturalis, sicut est rationis bonum. 
l6Etienne Gilson. Moral Values and the Moral Life, st. Louis, Herder, 1931, 
283-4. ----
l7Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 169, a.l, ad 2. 
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ing of self at all. That is why the ltagnanimous Man is not puffed up by 
great honors, nor depressed if honor is not given him. He is not thinking of 
himself. NAgnanimity makes him deem himself worthy of great things in con-
sideration of the gifts he holds from God.1& 4humility prevents him from 
aspiring after what is beyond him and so making himself ridiculous, as well 
as subjecting himself to that to which he should not be subject and so de-
grading himself. 
For st. Thomas there can be no question of classifying magnanimity under 
justice, for although the }~gnanimous tAn should be honored and honor is his 
due, yet it cannot be due him in justice because he has not of himself that 
to which honor is accorded. Rather, st. Thomas classifies magnanimity as a 
secondary virtue under fortitude. Without being in a proper sense identified 
with the virtue of fortitude, magnanimity is yet related to it and dependent 
on it. Fortitude, like the other cardinal virtues, can be taken in two ways: 
• 
first, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and as such, it is a 
condition of every virtue; secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firm-
ness only in bearing and withstanding those dangers in which it is most dif-
ficult to stand firm. 19 
There is a difference in the difficulties in which the brave man and the 
l8Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 129, a.3, ad 4. "Magnanimitas ergo facit quod homo SE 
magnis dignificet secundum considarationem donorum quae possidet ex Deo." 
19Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 123, a.2, c. "Nomen fortitudinis dupliciter accipi 
potest: uno modo secundum quod absolute importat quamdam animi firmitatem, 
et secundum hoc est generalis virtus, vel potius conditio cujus libet vir-
tutis ••• Alio modo potest accipi fortitudo secundum quod importat firmi-
tatemtantum in sustinendis et repelendis his in quibus maxima difficile 
est firmitatem habere, scilicet in aliquibus periculis gravibus." 
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N~gnanimous Man must stand firm. Honors are difficult to get, even though a 
man be worthy of them. The ~~gnanimous 1~n must have firmness of soul, not 
of course, so muoh as to faoe death, which is the prinoipal act of fortitude, 
but enough to stand up against the obstacles9 ttat block his way and would 
prevent him from aocomplishing the great deeds at which he aims. 20 
Lest we get the impression that beoause t~e Magnanimous Man is firm in 
resisting the obstaoles that oppose his aooomplishment of great deeds, he is 
unduly aggressive, st. Thomas stresses the importance of confidenoe in the 
character of the 1~gnanimous Man. Confidenoe is allied to faith and hope. 
It is allied to faith beoause it pertains to faith to believe something and 
in somebody. It is not in himself and in his own ability and merits that the 
1~gnanimous Man believes; his faith is in God and in the divine assistanoe 
without whioh he knows that he oan do nothing.2l His faith is not oomplaoent 
belief in his own ability and merits. He has the power to perform great 
deeds, it is true, and as far as his own ability is conoerned, he has oon-
fidence in himself, but he realizes that it is in God that he can do all 
things. He realizes that it surpasses man to need nothing at all. In the 
first place he needs the help of God since no man oan accomplish anything 
without the divine assistance. He needs the help of others, also, and in so 
far as he has need of others, it belongs to the Magnanimous Man to have oon-
fidenoe in tham. 22 
Confidence is allied to hope in that confidence denotes the hope of 
20Sum• Theol. II-II, Q. 129, a.5, c. 
21Sum. Theol. II-II, Q. 129, a.6, c. 
22Sum• Theo1. II-II, Q. 129, a.5, ad 1. 
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having something, not a groundless hope, but one that is based on a considera-
tion alike of the great deeds to be done and his ability to do them. The 
Magnanimous Man is strong in hope that he will achieve the good on which he 
is intent. 
;. .. e., 
He will do what lies in his power. ~bat lies beyond it, God will 
do. 
COnfidence·gives security. The great wor\s are God's; so is the honor 
that f'ollows on their accomplishment. The NAgnanimous Man is not dispensed 
from labor and thought, but f'rom trouble of mind. Although perfect security 
will be a part of virtue's reward, yet here and now the Magnanimous NAn is 
secure. Nothing can disturb his peace of mind. 23 
The confidence and security of the Magnanimous Nan are expressions of 
the truest and most Christian attitude of soul, and the most spiritual: "re-
joicing in hope." He has reached the serene spiritual joy which rejoices in 
hope of the unseen, the unpossessed. He has let go of earthly things; for 
as long as a man is clutching at them to give him comfort, support, enter-
tainment, he has no peace. This is evident in his attitude toward goods of 
f'ortune. They are not so important that the Magnanimous Man should be unduly 
disturbed about them, nor are they so unimportant that he should disregard 
them completely. If' he were to be destitute of the goods of f'ortune he would 
not be less virtuous, but his virtue ~ght be less ef'f'ective.24 He realizes 
that man is dependent on external goods, and that it is his duty to acquire 
the material means that are necessary for the maintenance of' lif'e. Shif't-
23Sum. Theol. II-II, Q. 129, a.7, c. et ad 3. 
24Sum. Theol. II-II, Q. 129, a.8, ad 1 et 2. 
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lessness and improvidenoe are not virtues. Striving for wealth is not, how-
ever, an obligation. His attitude toward external goods is one of detaohment 
and indifferenoe beoause they are only means and ought to be sought only to 
the extent that they serve higher ends. Nothfht enslaves man more than a 
desire for riohes. The men who aim at the accumulation of wealth miss the 
finer things of life. For him, the accumulation of riches would prove a real 
.. 
obstaole to higher aohievement. In using the goods of fortune toward the 
acoomplishment of great deeds, the ~Agnanimous Man will manifest a fine soorn 
for them. It is a sign of nobility of mind to make little of material goods. 
Suoh is the Magnanimous Man as st. Thomas presents him. That he is a 
man of no ordinary virtue should be evident. Doubtless suoh men are needed, 
for there are great works to be done; but not all men are magnanimous. How 
is a man to go about beooming magnanimous? To be simply virtuous, a man must 
be inolined to do some kind of good deed. This inolination may be either 
natural or he may train himself to do what is good. 25 In either event, he 
.. 
~ll be in possession of the natural moral virtues, whioh through prudenoe are 
bound together; but he need not neoessarily be magnanimous. }/agnanimity 
raises a man above the common level and beoause ocoasion is not offered to all 
men for practioe in the matter of this virtue, a man oan have the other moral 
virtues without having magnanimity. His virtue is limited to lifting him up 
to the level of oommon duties, such virtues as a man must have to live an 
ordinary life. Not all men are worthy of great honor and great deeds are not 
25Sum• Theol. I-II, Q. 65, a.l, c. "Aliqua inolinatio in nobis existens ad 
opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum." 
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in proportion to the capacity of all men. But the fact that a man has not 
magnanimity does not detraot from the other moral virtues whioh he may pos-
sess. All the same, if he has aoquired the other moral virtues, he has the 
virtue of magnanimity virtually. If he perf~~ the works that present them-
selves, and that are proportioned to his merits and his capaoity to the best 
of his ability, when the great deeds after Which the 1~gnanimous Man strives 
.. 
oome his way, he will be both ready and worthy. If he uses small and ordi-
nary honors well he will not be in danger of succumbing to the attractiveness 
of great honors.26 
Such a man would be magnanimous but his would be natural acquired mag-
nanimity. He would still fall short of the ideal of the ~Agnanimous Man as 
st. Thomas portrays him. He would, by his own efforts, have aoquired virtues 
that would produoe good works direoted to an end not surpassing his natural 
powers. st. Thomas would hold that his virtue ~~s imperfect, not completely 
realizing the notion of virtue. 27 He has need of the theological virtues, 
infused by God into the soul, perfeot virtues, because they direct him to his 
end of ends. For man's happiness is not limited to this world alone. There 
is a happiness proportioned to his human nature which he can obtain by means 
of the natural virtues. But there is a happiness which surpasses all his 
powers and which he can obtain by the power of God alone and for the attain-
ment of which the natural virtues are of no avail. He must receive from God 
additional help by means of the theological virtues which have God as their 
26Sum• Theol. I-II, Q. 65, a.l, ad 1. 
27Sum• Theol. I-II, Q. 65, a.l, c. "Habitus inclinans ad bonum opus bene 
agendum. " 
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object and direct a man to Him. 28 
Recognizing an end that surpasses his natural powers and striving after 
the great things that are in proportion 'to his supernatural last end, aided 
~ ~ d thereto by the grace of God and referring the consequent honor to Go , he 
becomes the Magnanimous A~ as St. Thomas has presented him. To him God is 
the key to life and to happiness. Temporal lift centered in itself would be 
unsatisfactory and puzzling to him. It would not bear the mark of finality. 
Taken by itself life points to something beyond itself, to a vast finality, 
to spiritual and eternal destinies, to ultimate triumphs. He is a citizen of 
two worlds, one temporal and one eternal. There are great deeds to be done 
in the one but they get their value from the other. 
... 
28 1 Sum. Theol. I-II, Q. 62, a. , c. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DIF'FERENCES BETWEEN THE N.AGNANIMOUS ltJ.AN OF ARISTOTLE 
AND THE MAGNANIMOUS :MAN OF ST. 'THOMAS AQUINAS 
.,. "7 
In oonsidering the YAgnanimous Man as he is presented by Aristotle and 
then by st. Thomas the likenesses are perhaps ~re striking than the differ-
enoes. The NAgnanimous Man of the IUcomachean Ethics and the Magnanimous ](;an 
of the Summa Theologica often act in the same way, make the same moral judg-
ments; they are both virtuous, both concerned with great deeds and the con-
. 
sequent honors; they are both honorable and just. With the Greek as with the 
Christian what he prizes is intangible, immaterial; they are both unselfish; 
they may be equally so, but the Nagnanimous Man of Aristotle is satisfied, 
the ~~gnanim.ous Man of st. Thomas not at all so. The Greek was pledged to th 
ideal of honor, of the good; but to him. the ideal was attainable; it would 
... 
have been his fault and his disappointment if he had failed to attain it. 
he did attain it. He is a man of honor, a good citizen, a good human being. 
He knows it and he is content. 
The l~gnanimous Man of st. Thomas, on the other hand, measures himself 
by quite another standard,--not according to human exoellence but in relation 
to God. He is a citizen, but of another city. The idea of God becomes, to 
him, more real, more absorbing in proportion as he himself draws nearer to 
Him. He is living his life as it were in a new dimension, in which the good-
ness he has attained seems negligible, non-existent, in comparison vdth the 
goodness he apprehends. 
36 
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.' The difference in the standard of measurement of the two men is perhaps 
one of the most striking. For Aristotle, external conduct was the basis of 
worthiness. "That which is praised is good."l This accounts for the fact 
that in portraying the character of the Magnan~s Man Aristotle gave such a 
wealth of minute details: his intercourse with others, his attitudes, the 
impressions he created, hi~ walk, the tone of his voice; all details, but all 
\ important because for Aristotle this was virtue •. ~ The :Magnanimous Man of the 
Nicomachean Ethics assessed himself by a high standard of value, but it was 
the value in which he himself excelled. 
With st. Thomas there was poverty of detail but a wealth of emphasis. 
The 1agnanimous Man was good in the highest degree, but he owed his goodness 
to God. lionor, was his due, but the honor was referred to God. He practiced 
the greatest acts of all the virtues but they were united and crowned by 
charity. He is living his life, here and now, in relation to the supernatural 
life, in a medium unknown to the Magnanimous Man of Aristotle. For the Mag-'" 
nanimous Man of st. Thomas internal rectitude is substituted for external con-
duct as the basis of worthiness. For him, goodness consists radically in the 
internal choice.2 His will is directed to an overruling end, "to a transcen- I 
dent principle worthy of all honor in itself and absolutely, more truly even 
than virtue, which is honorable on account of this.,,3 Virtue was the be all 
and the end all of the Aristotelian Magnanimous Man. It was desired for it-
self and not for the sake of anything else. With st. Thomas virtue is desired 
lRhet. I, vi, 1363 a 9. 
~ Theologica, II-II, Q. 145, a.l, ad 3. 
3Etienne Gilson, ~. cit., 325. 
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that all the attributes asoribed to the supremely happy man can have no place 
in a life given to great deeds. Getting and safeguarding deserved honor is 
quite a task; acquiring and disposing of goods of fortune after the manner of 
;.p C? 
a Magnanimous l{.:an is likewise no slight matter. There are these and other 
distractions to prevent the Magnanimous N~ fram giving himself up to a life 
of contemplation. Ordained to the vita civilis he is one of those who must 
- . 
take oare of the world. 
For the l~gnanimous W~ of st. Thomas it is different. He, too, is a 
citizen, but he is not only a citizen of the earthly city, but he is also a 
member of the heavenly oity, of that heavenly Jerusalem whose prince is God 
and whose citizens are the angels and all the saints, whether they reign in 
glory and are stationed in the homeland, or are still in pilgrimage on this 
earth. 
Hamo non solum est civis terrenae civitatis, sed est parti-
ceps civitatis caelestis Jerusalem, cujus rector est Domi-
nus, et cives Angeli et sancti omnes, sive adhuc peregri-
nentur in terris ••• 9 
... 
The Magnanimous Man of' the Summa Theologioa is ~!!!; he has here no 
abiding city; but it is going to require more than the natural virtues with I 
which Aristotle equipped the Magnanimous Man in order that he reach his jour-
ney's end. For a man to be a member' of this oity, nature is not enough; he 
must be lifted up by God's grace. Furthermore, it is clear that the virtues 
neoessary for this final achievement he cannot aoquire by his own natural 
powers. The homeland is in an order that oannot be reaohed by his greatest 
9De Virt. in communi. Q. a. 9, c. 
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efforts. These virtues must be infused in him by God.10 
St. Thomas takes into account at once the orders of nature and of grace. 
The infused moral virtues proportion the Magnanimous Man's actions to his 
eternal end. The proper field of these virtu;s is that of eternal life begun 
with life on earth. st. Thomas does not disparage the ~ civilis. but he 
clearly recognizes that it is not the end of life. For the right living of 
.. 
oivil life a man has need of virtues that will temper his actions to that 
temporal end. the good of the state. 
Virtutes morales acquisitae dirigunt in vita oivili. unde 
habent bonum civile pro fine. 11 
These are the acquired moral virtues which he shares with the N~gnanimous Man 
of the Nicomachean Ethics. By them the virtuous aotivity of both men is pro-
portioned to their temporal end. 
The Magnanimous N~ of st. Thomas has need of these acquired moral vir-
tues. His human nature is no different from that of Aristotle's Magnanimo~ 
Man, nor does his temporal end differ from that of his predeoessor. But his 
acquired virtue has need of infused virtue to carry him beyond civil life. 
which belongs to the natural order, to his supernatural last'end. 
Of the two men, the Magnanimous NAIl of St. Thomas will most likely be 
the better citizen; will guide and direct his temporal life with a greater 
measure of sucoess than will the Magnanimous Man of Aristotle. The strength 
10Idam. "Ad hoo autem quod homo hujus civitatis sit partioeps, non sufficit 
~natura, sed ad hoc elevatur per gratiam Dei. Nam manifestum est quod 
virtutes illae quae sunt haminis in quantum est hujus oivitatis partioeps, 
non possunt ab eo acquiri per sua naturalia: unde non oausantur ab actibus 
nostris sed ex divino munere in nobis infunduntur." 
llIn ~. Dist. 33, Q. 1, a.4, o. 
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of the latter is measured by that supplied him by the acquired moral virtues. 
The Magnanimous Man of St. Thomas has in addition to the acquired moral vir-
tues. sanctifying grace. oharity, and the infused moral virtues. The acts of 
;.p tiC; 
the acquired virtues which he performs in the temporal order are elevated by 
charity and the corresponding infused virtues. 
Although they live and work si~e by sidets citizens of the earthly city, 
the temporal life of the Aristotelian Magnanimous 1~. the good life in the 
state, has a temporal end. The life and activity of the Magnanimous Ma.n of 
St. Thomas is referred to a supernatural end. 
With Aristotle moral philosophy was subordinated to politics. Moral 
philosophy found its realization in political philosophy. It was the function 
of moral philosophy to make good citizens and the end of the virtuous man was 
the happy life in the state. Moral philosophy fulfilled its end in dealing 
with the human-acts of man ordained to a temporal life and natural ends. 
st. Thomas would hold, on the other hand. that the Magnanimous Nan of 
Aristotle would be in danger of missing the attainment of his natural end. 
He maintains that man only orders his life efficaciously for its natural last 
end if he also orders it efficaciously for its supernatural last end. For st. 
Thomas political philosophy has to make room for the oonsideration of the last 
end to whioh political life has reference indirectly. 
For st. Thomas Aquinas the Magnanimous Man was not only human, he was 
also divine. He had an end that was human and temporal, but he had at the 
same time an end that was divine. The Magnanimous Nan needed the best natural 
42 
equipment in the way of the acquired virtues that he could get to insure his 
temporal end but he needed also sanctifying grace and the infused virtues to 
insure the attainment of his supernatural end. st. Thomas knew this because 
he was "philosophizing in the faith. II The x.ig"iianimous Allan of st. Thomas has 
his abode in a Summa of Theology. It was st. Thomas the philosopher who in 
dealing with the J:i1agnanimous Man was dealing ~h the direction of that man's 
human aots, but it was st. Thomas the Theologian that supplied the faot that 
the ¥Agnanimous }an's last end is supernatural. 
The contrast between these two men we may take as an emphasis on other 
worldly values as opposed to this-worldly, on eternal as against temporal; on 
supernatural as against natural, or including and summing up all the alterna-
tives, reoognition of God as the ultimate reality of life, or man. This 
seems to be the essential differenoe underlying and dominating all others. 
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